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In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations (ATA), the Supreme Court held
unanimously that "economic considerations [may] play no part in the promulgation of ambient air
standards under section 109 of the CAA (Clean Air Act)."1 The ATA opinion raises a host of
difficult and important issues, e.g., what is the scope of the holding; how should agencies that fall
within the scope of the holding make regulatory decisions; and, how should courts review agency
decisions that fall within the scope of the holding? I will discuss some of those issues in this
article.
In part I, I discuss the ATA opinion and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
actions that were the subject of that opinion. In part II, I discuss the scope of the holding. Prior
to ATA, courts had interpreted only two provisions of regulatory statutes to preclude an agency
from considering costs in any way. 2 Courts had interpreted the vast majority of provisions in
regulatory statutes to permit agencies to consider costs in some manner in their decisionmaking.
In some cases, the relevant language of the statutes clearly authorized, or required, agency
consideration of costs. In many cases, however, courts interpreted statutory provisions to permit
agencies to consider costs even though the relevant statutory language was either silent or

*

Richard J Pierce, Jr. is Lyle T. Alverson Research Professor of Law at George
Washington University.
1

121 S. Ct. 903, 908 (2001).

2

Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev.
1613, 1667-68 (1995).
1

ambiguous with respect to the appropriate treatment of co sts. In those cases, the courts used one
or more canons of construction t o support a holding that ambiguous statutory language should be
interpreted to authorize agencies to consider costs. 3 I explore several related statutory
interpret ation questions raised by ATA, e.g., do any of the prior canonical approaches to
regulatory statutes survive ATA, or does that opinion create a new canon of construction that will
have the effect of prohibiting many agencies from considering costs in many circumstances? I
conclude that courts should apply neither a pro-cost canon nor an anti-cost canon, but that they
should assume that Congress has permitted an agency to consider any factor that is logically
relevant to a decision unless Congress has clearly prohibited the agency from considering a
particular decisional factor.
In part III, I ask what a court should do when it is required to review a regulatory decision
made by an agency that is not allowed to consider costs in any way. I focus on a particular subset
of agency decisions that is typified by the two EPA decisions that were at issue in ATA -decisions to establish maximum permissible concentration levels for substances that appear to
have no threshold below which they have no serious adverse effects on human health and that
appear to be characterized by linear dose-response curves. In that important context, I conclude
that a court often will have no choice but to reverse and remand an agency decision as arbitrary
and capricious if the agency is prohibited from explaining its decision with reference to its
consideration of costs.
In part IV, I discuss a series of questions that EPA, and potentially other agencies, must
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address in the wake of ATA. The Court declared that section 109 "bars cost considerations"4, and
it stated that any agency decision would have to be vacated if a petitioner "proved" that the EPA
Administrator co nsidered costs in making the decision. 5 The Court's stat ements raise many
important questions, e.g., can agency staff members, Advisory Committee members, and /or the
President consider costs in playing their respective roles in the agency decisionmaking process? If
so, the decision of the Administrator will reflect consideration of costs even if the Administrator
does not directly consider costs, since she can, must, and will consider the views of her staff, the
Advisory Committee, and the President when she makes her decision. 6 I next ask what would
qualify as "proof" that an Administrator illegally considered costs in making a decision? I suggest
that the Court will never allow a petitioner to "prove" what all participants in this decisionmaking
process know -- the EPA Administrator always considers costs in making decisions pursuant to
CAA section 109. This suggests the possibility that EPA might be able to defend its actions to
the satisfaction of a court by referring to the recommendations of third parties who considered
costs. Finally, I ask whether the Administrator can consider costs in the form of the direct or
indirect adverse health effects of a more stringent standard. I argue that she should be permitted
to consider the public health costs of a more stringent standard even if she is prohibited from
considering the economic costs of a more stringent standard. If the Administrator is permitted to
balance health costs against health costs, she may be able to provide rational explanations for her
decisions in a manner that is consistent with the Court's prohibition on her consideration of the
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economic costs of her decisions.
I.

THE AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS CASE
The Court's 2001 opinions in ATA7 addressed three issues that were raised by the D.C.

Circuit in 1999.8 The D.C. Circuit opinions, in turn, addressed several issues that were raised by
two rules issued by EPA in 1997.9 In this part of the article, I will summarize the most important
elements of the Supreme Court's opinions and the D.C. Circuit's opinions. I will also describe the
most important characteristics of the two EPA actions that were the subject of those opinions. I
will expand on those initial descriptions in later parts of the article to the extent that more
expansive descriptions are required to understand the questions addressed in those parts.
A. The ATA Opinions
Justice Scalia's opinion for a unanimous Court resolved three issues. The Court reversed
the D.C. Circuit in one respect: by holding that EPA's interpretation of CAA section 109 does not
violate the nondelegation doctrine.10 It affirmed the D.C. Circuit in two respects: by holding that
EPA's method of implementing its new ozone standard is unlawful11 and by holding that CAA
section 109 prohibits EPA from considering costs when it sets national ambient air quality
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standards. 12 I will discuss only issues that are raised by the last holding. Four Justices wrote
three concurring opinions,13 but only Justice Breyer addressed the potential role of costs in setting
air quality standards. 14
Justice Scalia began his opinion by suggesting that the Court might be able to resolve the
statutory interpretation issue simply by applying the plain meaning rule.15 Section 109 instructs
EPA to set air quality standards that "are requisite to protect the public health" with "an adequate
margin of safety."16 Justice Scalia "thought it fairly clear that this text does not permit the EPA to
consider costs in setting the standards."17 He then conceded, however, that the dictionary
definitions of "public health," "requisite," and "adequate margin" include some meanings that
would allow EPA to consider costs. 18 He rejected use of any of those definitions, however,
because "it [is] implausible that Congress would give to the EPA through t hese modest words the
power to determine whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality
standards."19
Justice Scalia seemed to announce and to apply a new canon of construction in the process
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of rejecting the argument that EPA co uld consider costs -- an agency can consider costs only if
Congress has clearly authorized it to do so. He said that "to prevail . . . respondents must show a
textual commitment . . . to the EPA to consider costs . . . ."20 Moreover, "that textual
commitment must be a clear one."21 Since Justice Scalia found no such "clear" "textual
commitment," he concluded that section 109 "bars cost considerations."22
Justice Breyer concurred with Justice Scalia's interpretation of section 109, but he did so
on an entirely different basis.23 He expressed the view that the statutory language alone was
insufficient to bar EPA from considering costs, and he rejected Justice Scalia's assertion that an
agency can consider costs only if Congress has made a "clear" "textual commitment" to consider
costs. 24 Instead, Justice Breyer would "read silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory
statutes as permitting, not forbidding, this kind of rational regulation", i.e., regulation that is based
on consideration of costs. 25 Ultimately, however, Justice Breyer was persuaded by the statute's
legislative hist ory that Congress intended to prohibit EPA from co nsidering costs in setting air
quality standards.26
The Court's opinion is highly abstract and devoid of any discussion of the practicalities of
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its implementation. Thus, for instance, the Court told us nothing about the manner in which EPA
made the two decisions at issue, the manner in which EPA can, or sho uld, make such decisions in
the future, or how it can make such decisions without considering costs in any way. The Court
also said nothing about how a court can, or should, review such an agency decision t o determine
whether it is arbitrary and capricious.
B.

The EPA Rulemakings

The ATA opinion was precipitated by two rules in which EPA announced new ambient air
standards applicable to particulate matter (PM) and ozone. 27 The new ozone standard permits a
maximum concentration of 0.08 parts per million (ppm) versus the pre-existing maximum
permissible concentration of 0.12 ppm.28 The new PM standard controls particles as small as 2.5
microns versus the pre-existing standard that applied only to particles as small as 10 microns.29
EPA also increased the stringency of the PM standard by changing the basis for measuring the
maximum permissible concentration of PM and by decreasing the maximum permissible
concentration of PM in a 24-hour period.30 EPA based the new, more stringent standards on over
one hundred recent studies that found that ozone and PM were continuing to produce severe
adverse health effects, including death, even in areas that were in compliance with the pre-existing
standards. 31 EPA solicited and received comments on those studies and their regulatory
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implications from over 100,000 parties. 32 The resulting rulemaking records were over one million
pages long. EPA explained the bases for its new standards in statements of basis and purpose that
were hundreds of pages long.33
Ozone and PM have two important characteristics in common. Both are believed to be
non-threshold pollutants that are subject to linear dose-response curves.34 That means that, based
on the best scientific evidence available at present, both substances seem to produce adverse
health effects at any concentration level above zero, and the magnitude of those adverse effects
appear to be proportionate to the concentration of the substance to which people are exposed. It
bears emphasis, however, that our present knowledge of the characteristics of both substances is
limited and is subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Over time, we might discover that either
substance has a threshold below which it causes no harm and that either has a convex or concave
dose-response curve. Both the EPA staff and its Scientific Advisory Committee concluded,
however, that the best interpretations of the presently available data support assumptions of no
zero-harm thresholds and linear dose-response curves for both substances. 35
The D.C. Circuit accepted the EPA's characterization of the adverse public health effects
of ozone and PM. 36 The D.C. Circuit majority was extremely troubled, however, by the combined
effect of those characteristics and of EPA's claim that it did not consider costs in any way when it
32
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announced the new maximum permissible concentrations of ozo ne and PM. Without considering
costs, the majority could not understand how EPA decided "how much is too much."37 If EPA
believes that ozone and PM harm the public health at every concentration level, and that each
additional increment of either produces about the same amount of adverse effects on public
health, it would seem to follow logically that EPA should set the maximum permissible
concentration o f each at zero if EPA does not consider costs in any way.38 In any event, the court
could not understand why EPA set the standards at the concentration levels it announced rather
than at lower levels that obviously would protect the public health more effectively than the levels
it chose.39 A dissenting judge expressed the view that EPA had adequately explained its
decisions.40
Usually, a court reverses an agency action as arbitrary and capricious if the agency's
explanation for its action is inadequate to allow the court to understood why the agency acted as
it did.41 Inexplicably, however, the D.C. Circuit did not address the arbitrary and capricious
issue. Instead, it used its inability to understand the basis for the EPA decisions to support its
radical and unprecedent ed ho lding t hat section 109 of the CAA is unconstitutional. 42 The

37

Id. at 1034.

38

Id. at 1037.

39

Id. at 1036.

40

Id. at 1057.

41

See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., I Administrative Law Treatise §7.4 (4th ed. 2001).

42

175 F.3d at 1036-1038. See discussion in Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Inherent Limits on
Judicial Control of Agency Discretion: The D.C. Circuit and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 52
Admin. L. Rev. 63 (2000).
9

Supreme Court unanimously reversed that holding,43 but neither court addressed the arbitrary and
capricious issue. At oral argument, several Justices raised the arbitrary and capricious issue with
counsel for EPA in ways that suggested that those Justices shared the D.C. Circuit's bewilderment
with respect to the basis for EPA's decisions.44 The Justices dropped the issue, however, when
counsel for EPA reminded them that the arbitrary and capricious issue was not before the Court.45
As a result, neither court addressed that issue in any way, even though bo th the judges and the
Justices appeared to find the issue difficult and puzzling.
While ozone and PM appear to share two important characteristics – no zero-harm
threshold and a linear dose-response curve -- they differ significantly in other important respects.
Generally, PM causes much greater damage to public health than does ozone. Thus, for instance,
EPA estimated that the more stringent PM standard it announced would save about 10,000 lives
per year,46 while the more stringent ozone standard would yield the more modest benefit of
reducing the incidence of serious respiratory distress suffered by asthmatics by tens of thousands
of cases per year.47
Even though EPA denied that it considered economics in any way in choosing the new
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Ambient Air Quality Standards and Proposed Regional Haze Rule ES-17 to 18 [hereinafter RIA]
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3700 to 17,900 lives per year). See also 61 Fed. Reg. 65641-65643; 62 Fed Reg. 38653.
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PM and ozone standards, the two rulemaking records included ext ensive treatments of economic
issues. By the time EPA solicited public comments on its proposed new standards, EPA had
published and placed on its website a 718-page analysis of the estimated costs and benefits of the
two proposed rules.48 Many parties submitted comments on that study. Some parties
commissioned and submitted competing studies that purported to demonstrate that EPA had
underestimated the costs and overestimated the benefits of its proposed rules.49 The Office of
Management and Budget, the President's Council of Economic Advisors, the Department of
Energy, and t he House Committees with oversight responsibility for EPA also became actively
involved in the highly visible public debate about the costs and benefits of EPA's proposed rules.50
EPA made significant changes in its draft cost-benefit-analysis in response to t he comments and
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See, e.g., Randall Lutter, Is EPA's Ozone Standard Feasible? Joint Center for
Regulatory Studies (Dec. 1999); Stephen Huebner & Kenneth Chilton, EPA's Case for New
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Study of American Business Policy, Study 27 (1997); Mercatus Center, Comments on NAAQS
for PM (Mar. 12, 1997); Mercatus Center, Comments on NAAQS for Ozone (Mar. 12, 1997);
Anne E. Smith, et al., Costs, Economic Impacts, and Benefits of EPA's Ozone and Particulate
Standards, Reason Public Policy Institute 15 (June 1997); Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Science
and the High Cost of Cleaner Air (Oct. 19, 1997).
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Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
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criticisms it received.51 At the end of the decisionmaking process, however, EPA announced that
it had ignored all of the data and public debate about the costs and benefits of its proposed rules,
including its own economic analysis of the rules, even though the final standards EPA chose
happened to fall in the range in which EPA's economic analysis showed that the estimated benefits
of the two rules exceeded their estimated costs by several billion dollars.52
II.

THE SCOPE OF THE HOLDING
Prior to ATA, courts had interpreted all but two provisions of regulatory statutes to permit

an agency to consider costs in some way in making decisions.53 In some cases, the relevant
statutory language clearly authorized the agency to consider costs, but in many cases, the statute
was silent or ambiguous on that issue. The language of many of the statutes that had been
interpreted to permit consideration of costs is remarkably similar to the language of CAA section
109 that the ATA Court held to bar consideration of costs. Thus, for instance, courts have held
that an agency can consider costs when it decides whether an air quality standard provides an
"ample margin of safety" 54 and when it decides whether pollutants from one state "contribute
significantly" 55 to another state's inability to comply with a federal clean air standard.
A.

The Pro-Cost Canon

51

See detailed analysis in Brief of Cross-Petitioner Chamber of Commerce of the United
States in American Trucking Associations v. Browner, Supreme Court No. 99-1426, pp. 10-28
(July 21, 2000).
52

RIA at ES-12 to -22.

53

Wagner, supra. note 2, at 1667-1668.

54

NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. en banc 1987).

55

Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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Prior to ATA, courts had interpreted all ambiguous provisions of regulatory statutes to
authorize consideration of costs by applying one or both of two canons of construct ion. The first
of those canons had its origin in a 1987 en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit -- a provision of a
regulatory statute will be construed to bar an agency from considering costs only if "there is clear
congressional intent to preclude consideration of costs."56 Courts have since applied that canon
consistently in a long line of cases.57 For convenience, I will call it the pro-cost canon.
The proponents of the pro-cost canon includes scores of scholars whose names read like a
list of who's who in administrative law and regulatory economics.58 Each of the last seven
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NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163.
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E.g., Allied Local & Regional Manufacturers Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 78 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000); George E. Warren Corp. v.
EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 622-624 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154
F.3d 455, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1998); NRDC v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641, 643-646 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
58

Brief Amici Curiae of Gary E. Marchant, Cary Coglianese, Daniel M. Byrd III, Gail
Charnley, Maureen L. Cropper, E. Donald Elliott, David L. Paigman, James K. Hammitt, James
E. Krier, William A. Lash III, Roger D. McClellan, Thomas W. Merrill, Lars Noah, Joyce E.
Penner, Robert Phaler, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Joseph Sanders, Robert N. Stavins, Jonathan B.
Wiener and James D. Wilson in Support of Respondents, in Browner v. American Trucking
Associations, Supreme Court No. 99-1257 (Sep. 11, 2000); Brief Amici Curiae of AEI-Brookings
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Kenneth J. Arrow, Elizabeth E. Bailey, William J. Baumol,
Jagdish Bhagwati, Michael J. Boskin, David F. Bradford, Robert W. Crandall, Maureen L.
Cropper, Christopher C. Demuth, George C. Eads, Milton Friedman, John D. Graham, Wendy L.
Gramm, Robert W. Hahn, Paul L. Joskow, Alfred E. Kahn, Paul R. Krugman, Lester B. Lave,
Robert E. Litan, Randall W. Lutter, Paul W. Macavoy, Paul W. McCracken, James C. Miller III,
William A. Niskanen, William D. Nordhaus, Wallace E. Oates, Peter Passell, Sam Peltzman, Paul
R. Portney, Alice M. Rivlin, Milton Russell, Richard L. Schmalensee, Charles L. Schultze, V.
Kerry Smith, Robert M. Solow, Robert N. Stavins, Joseph E. St iglitz, Laura D'Andrea Tyson, W.
Kip Viscusi, Murray L. Weidenbaum, Janet L. Yellen, and Richard J. Zeckhauser in Support of
Cross-Petitioners in American Trucking Associations v. Browner, Supreme Court No. 99-1426
(July 21, 2000); I Pierce, supra. note 41, at 453-455; Stephen G. Breyer, Richard B. Stewart,
Cass R. Sunstein & Matthew L. Spitzer, Administrative Law & Regulatory Policy 65 (4th ed.
1999); Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Jurisprudence: Canons Redux? 79 Cal. L. Rev. 807, 817
L. Rev. 405, 487 (1989). (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Administrative
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Presidents has also endorsed the fundamental principle that agencies should consider costs in
making all major decisions.59 Presidents, judges, and scholars have supported the pro-cost canon
with arguments that are simple and compelling. All individuals and institutions naturally and
instinctively consider costs in making any important decision. A court should not conclude that
Congress has forbidden an agency from adhering to that logical and ubiquitous practice unless
Congress has clearly and explicitly barred an agency from complying with that first principle of
rational decisionmaking. Moreover, it is often impossible for a regulatory agency to make a
rational decision without considering costs in some way. Justice Breyer summarized the case in
support of the pro-co st canon in his concurring opinion in ATA60:
In order to better achieve regulatory goals -- for example to allocate resources so
that they save more lives or produce a cleaner environment -- regulators must
often take account of a proposed regulation's adverse effects. Thus, I believe that,
other things equal, we should read silences or ambiguities in the language of
regulat ory statutes as permitting, not forbidding, t his type of rational regulat ion.
Justice Breyer concurred in the Court's holding that CAA section 109 bars consideration of costs
only because he found compelling evidence in the legislative history of CAA that Congress
specifically, repeatedly, and unequivocally decided to bar consideration of costs in making

Stat e, 103 Harv.
59

I Pierce, supra. note 41, at §7.9. For discussion of the history of Executive Orders that
require agencies to perform cost-benefit-analyses, see Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1995).
60

121 S. Ct. at 921.
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decisions pursuant to that section. 61
B.

The Be Reasonable Canon

The second canon that courts have used to support holdings that ambiguous or silent
statutes should be interpreted to allow consideration of costs is much broader in its potential
scope -- an agency-administered statute should not be interpreted to bar an agency from
considering any factor that is logically relevant to a decision unless Congress has clearly and
explicitly barred the agency from considering that decisional factor.62 That principle might be best
understood as a component of the arbitrary and capricious test, rather than as a canon of statutory
construction. Any agency action must survive judicial application of the arbitrary and capricious
test to be upheld on review.63 The Supreme Court explained its method of applying the arbitrary
and capricious test in its landmark opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Assn64:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
The Court's description o f the test is ambiguo us in an important respect. The Court says

61

Id. at 921-922.
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George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 623-624.

63

5 U.S.C. §706.

64

463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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that an agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency "relied on factors which Congress
has not intended it to consider." In this passage, the Court could have intended to bar an agency
from considering any factor Congress did not explicitly identify as a decisional factor in the
relevant statute, or the Court could have intended only to bar an agency from considering a factor
that Congress itself barred the agency from considering. The latter reading of the phrase is far
more realistic and sensible. Like the rest of us, members of Congress are always seeking to
further many societal goals -- far more than Congress lists in any statute. Jerry Mashaw and
David Harfst have made the point well65:
This agency, any agency, should always read between the lines of its statute an
implicit qualification of the form: "Don't forget that this statute does not exhaust
our vision of the good life or the good society. Remember that we have other
goals and other purposes that will sometimes conflict with the goals and purposes
of this statute. If we forgot to mention all those potential conflicting purposes in
your instructions, take note of them anyway. For heaven's sake, be reasonable."
The principle that Mashaw and Harfst explain so well can be stated in the form of a canon
of construction: a court should not conclude that Congress intended to bar an agency from
considering a factor that is logically relevant to a decision unless Congress has clearly manifested
its intent to bar consideration of that factor. For convenience, I will refer to t hat principle as the
be reasonable canon. Courts have often applied such a canon.66 The D.C. Circuit's 1998 opinion

65

Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 215 (1990).

66

E.g., Allied Local & Regional Manufacturers Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 78; Grand
Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 475; International Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S.,
735 F.2d 1525, 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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in George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA67 provides a good illustration.
The CAA Amendments of 1990 included provisions that required EPA to establish a
reformulated gasoline program that would improve air quality by reducing the pollutants emitted
as a result of combustion of gasoline in automobiles.68 EPA issued rules that required refiners to
provide a new mix of gasoline products to the U.S. market.69 The rules provided for different
treatment of foreign and domestic refiners.70 Foreign refiners bro ught a proceeding at the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in which they alleged that the rules discriminated against foreign
refiners in violation of U.S. treaty obligations. WTO agreed with the foreign refiners.71 EPA then
amended the rules in ways that brought them in compliance with applicable treaty provisions.72
EPA also considered costs and pract icability in crafting the amended rules. Domestic refiners and
environmental organizations challenged the validity of the amended rules on the basis that EPA
had unlawfully considered other factors, including the WTO decision, costs, and practicability,
when the statute instructed it to consider only air quality when it issued rules to implement the
reformulated gasoline provisions of CAA.
The court upheld the amended rules. It acknowledged that the statute identified air quality
as the sole goal of the reformulated gasoline program. Indeed, the court had previously held that

67

159 F.3d 616.

68

42 U.S.C. §7545.

69

59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (1994).

70

159 F.3d at 619.

71

Id. at 619.

72

Id. at 619-620.
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the "sole purpose of the [reformulated gasoline] program is to reduce air pollution."73 The court
referred, however, to its "usual reluctance to infer from congressional silence an intention to
preclude the agency from considering factors other than those listed in a statute . . . ."74 It said
that its "usual reluctance . . . is bolstered in this case by the decisions of the WTO lurking in the
background."75 It cited, and quoted from, several Supreme Court opinions that admonish courts
to interpret statutes in a manner consistent with international law.76 Many other cases apply the
canon that congressional silence should not be interpreted to bar an agency from considering a
wide variety of factors, including cost, that are logically relevant to a decision. 77
To review the situation before ATA, courts had applied one or both of two canons as
bases for a long line of decisions in which they held that a regulatory agency can consider costs in
its decisionmaking unless Congress clearly prohibited the agency from considering costs. As a
result, Courts had interpreted all of the many provisions of regulatory statutes that are ambiguous
or silent with respect to costs to permit the agency to consider costs, and courts had interpreted
only two statutory provisions to bar consideration of costs -- in both cases because of powerful
evidence that Congress intended to bar the agency from considering costs in making the particular
decisions at issue.
To what extent do those two canons and that large body of case law survive ATA? The
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holding in ATA is easy to reconcile with the pre-existing law in the area, but the reasoning in ATA
raises serious questions about the continuing vitality of the pre-existing law. The Court could
have supported the holding with the reasoning in Justice Breyer's concurring opinion:78 a court
should assume that Congress intended to allow an agency to consider costs unless it finds
compelling evidence to the contrary, but the legislative history of CAA section 109 provides such
evidence. The Court also could have relied on the reasoning at the beginning of Justice Scalia's
opinion: 79 the plain meaning of the language of CAA section 109 precludes EPA from considering
costs. An opinion based on either o f those methods of reasoning would have left t he pre-existing
canons and case law intact.
C.

The Anti-Cost Canon

The Court did not support its holding with either of those lines of reasoning, however.
Instead, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court seemed to announce and to apply a new canon that
is inherently inconsistent with all of the pre-existing law applicable to int erpret ation o f agencyadministered regulatory statutes. After recognizing that the language of section 109 could bear an
interpretation that allowed EPA to consider costs in some way, Justice Scalia rejected any such
interpretation because respondents failed to show a "clear" "textual commitment of authority to
EPA to consider costs . . . ."80 That reasoning reflects the application of a common form of a
canon of construction -- a clear statement rule, i.e., we will not interpret a statute t o allow an
agency to consider costs in any way unless Congress has clearly indicated that the agency is
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allowed to consider costs. I will refer to that as the anti-cost canon.
D.

Choosing Among the Competing Canons

Prior to ATA, courts applied two clear statement rules that had the effect of allowing any
agency to consider costs unless Congress clearly prohibited it from doing so. Both of those
canons of construction are inconsistent with the new clear statement rule the Court announced
and applied in ATA . Does ATA disapprove of the pre-existing canons and overrule the long line
of cases that were decided through application of those canons? That question is important
because there are scores of provisions of regulatory statutes that are silent or ambiguous with
respect to agency consideration of costs. The Court provided only a few indeterminate clues that
we can use to try to answer that question.
The Court told us little about the strength, scope, or source of the new anti-cost canon.
The Court made several vague or metapho rical references to its apparent belief that Congress is
explicit when it intends to allow an agency to consider costs, e.g., "Congress . . . does not hide
elephants in mouseholes."81 It provided no evidence or reasoning in support of either that
questionable belief or the resulting canon except for the noncontroversial but unhelpful
observation that Congress sometimes explicitly authorizes an agency to consider costs.82
The Court also did not say anything that is helpful in resolving the obvious conflict
between the two pre-existing canons and the new anti-cost canon. The text of the Court's opinion
made no reference at all to the pre-existing canons or to the many circuit opinions that have
applied those canons as the basis for holdings that allow agencies to consider costs. The Court
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indirectly and implicitly acknowledged the conflict between its holding and reasoning and some of
the pre-existing law in a footnote, however.83 The Court cited three of the cases in which the
D.C. Circuit applied the pro-cost canon to support holdings that allowed EPA to consider costs in
making other classes of decisions and distinguished those cases on the basis that none of the
statutory provisions at issue "shares section 109(b)(1)'s prominence in the overall statutory
scheme." It is hard to know what that means.
The Court's terse treatment of the pro-cost canon suggests that it approves of the
traditional application of the pro-cost canon to most statutory provisions, but that a court must
apply the new anti-cost canon to any provision of great prominence in a statutory scheme. A
legal regime with such a dichotomous set of canons makes so little sense, however, that it is hard
to believe that the Court really intended to instruct lower courts to apply opposite canons of
construction to linguistically equivalent statutory provisions depending upon each provision's
relative "prominence" in a statutory scheme. Thus, we are left with no useful guidance with
respect to the circumstances in which the pro-cost canon applies versus the circumstances in
which the anti-cost canon applies. We know even less about the Court's attitude t oward the be
reasonable canon or the relationship between that canon and the obviously inconsistent new anticost canon. The ATA Court made no reference either to the be reasonable canon or to any of the
cases in which courts have applied that canon.
Given the confusing and indeterminate manner in which the Court discussed the traditional
pro-cost canon, the new anti-cost canon, the be reasonable canon, and the relationship among
those canons, it may make the most sense to ignore the Court's terse and confusing references to
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canons and to focus instead on the case for and against judicial application of each of the three
canons. That is t he approach the Court is most likely to take in future cases. The Court is
reluctant to overrule its own precedents, but it has shown considerable willingness to ignore
portions of the reasoning in its precedents.84
The anti-cost canon the ATA Court applied is new. I have not found any reference to it in
any prior judicial opinion or in any scholarly writing. It seems to be based entirely on the Court’s
apparent belief that Congress intends to bar consideration of costs in regulatory decisionmaking
unless it clearly authorizes an agency to consider costs, at least if the statutory provision at issue
is particularly “prominent.” Justice Scalia provided no data or reasoning in support of that
apparent belief, and I am unaware of anyone else who has attempted to support it. Thus, the case
in support of the anti-cost canon must be considered weak, particularly in light of the much
stronger case in suppo rt of the pro-co st canon.
The D.C. Circuit announced the pro-cost canon in a unanimous en banc opinion in 1987.85
It has applied that canon consistently and with no dissenting opinions in a long line of cases that
arose in a wide variety of contexts.86 EPA has frequently and successfully urged the D.C. Circuit
to apply that pro-cost canon.87 The pro-cost canon has been explained and supported by scores of
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distinguished scholars in numerous books and art icles.88 It has also been implicitly supported by
each of the past seven Presidents of both political parties,89 and it was explicitly supported by
Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion in ATA.90 Benjamin Franklin described the common sense
basis for the pro-co st canon over two centuries ago. Writing to a friend who was perplexed by a
difficult decision, he explained his own approach: 91
When those difficult cases occur, they are difficult, chiefly because while we have
them under consideration, all the reasons pro and con are not present to t he mind
at the same time. . . . To get over this, my way is to divide half a sheet of paper by
a line into two columns; writing over the one Pro, and over the other Con. Then,
during three or four days consideration, I put down under the different heads short
hints of the different motives, that at different times occur to me, for or against the
measure. When I have thus got them all together in one view, I endeavor to
estimate their respect ive weights. . . . And, t hough t he weight of reasons cannot be
taken with the precision of algebraic quantities, yet when each is thus considered,
separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me, I think I can judge
better, and am less liable to make a rash step, and in fact I have found great
advantage from this kind of equation, in what may be called moral or prudential
algebra.
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The case in support of the pro-cost canon is strong, but a pair of scholars have developed
a series of powerful arguments against judicial acceptance of that canon. David Driessen argues
that the judiciary would be usurping t he power of Co ngress to make major social policy decisions
if it were to adopt the pro-cost canon.92 He analogizes such an action to the widely criticized
decisions of the Lochner-era Court to use a politically controversial economic philosophy as the
basis to resolve many disputes.93 He notes that many citizens oppo se use of costs in making
environmental, health, and safety regulatory decisions, in part because use of costs in those
contexts requires a decisionmaker to place a monetary value on human life.94 Lisa Heinzerling
illustrates the politically controversial nature of the pro-cost canon by noting that Congress
recently engaged in a heated debate on a Bill that would have required agencies to consider costs
in making all regulatory decisions.95 That Bill was defeated by a narrow margin.
I find the pro-cost canon appealing. As I will explain in the next part of this article, I do
not believe it is possible to make many regulatory decisions in a rational manner without
considering costs in some way.96 Regrettably, however, Driessen and Heinzerling have persuaded
me that courts should not adopt, or retain, a pro-cost canon. Courts are already struggling to
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avoid the public perception that judges are simply life-tenured politicians in robes.97 Judicial
adoption of the politically contentious pro-cost canon could contribute to that unfortunate public
perception.
That leaves only the quest ion whether the courts should adopt the be reasonable canon,
i.e., a court should not interpret congressional silence to bar agency consideration of any factor
that is logically relevant to a decision. Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst have done a particularly
good job of explaining and supporting that canon. 98 Every citizen/voter has a complicated, multifaceted picture of the good life. That picture includes prosperity, peace, health, a clean
environment, and scores of other characteristics of a society that cause each of us to consider it
good. Congress necessarily reflects that same complicated mix of myriad values and goals. It is
safe to assume that Congress wants agencies to consider all of those values and goals. Yet, it
would be totally unrealistic to expect Congress to list in any single statute all of those often
conflicting values and goals as factors an agency can consider in making any important decision.
It follows that a court would be foolish to interpret a statute in which Congress has listed two,
three, or four decisional factors as reflective of a congressional decision to ban agency
consideration of the many other values and goals that are relevant to a decisionmaking process
and t hat are shared by virtually all citizens and members of Congress. Thus, a court should
interpret a statute to bar an agency from considering a factor that is logically relevant to a
decision only if Congress has clearly manifested its intent to prohibit agency consideration of that
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factor.
The case in support of the be reasonable canon is extremely powerful. That canon also is
not vulnerable to the criticism that it enmeshes the judiciary too deeply into the political process.
The be reasonable canon is politically neutral. It can be used, and should be used, to allow
agencies to consider the potential effects of their decisions on the econo my,99 on U.S. treaty
obligations,100 on international relations,101 on public health and the environment,102 and on myriad
other social goals and values that are universally embraced by citizens and our elected
representatives.
The courts should adopt the be reasonable canon, and they should reject both the pro-cost
canon and the anti-cost canon. Of course, the be reasonable canon, like all other canons of
construction, provides only a framework for making a class of decisions. A court could easily
apply the be reasonable canon and still conclude that Congress clearly prohibited EPA from
considering costs in setting air quality standards pursuant to CAA section 109, as Justice Breyer
reasoned in his concurring opinion in ATA103. Thus, whether the prohibition on costs announced
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in ATA applies to many types of decisions or to only a few, courts will be called upon to review
some important agency actions that fall within the scope of that holding.
III.

JUDICIAL REVIEW AFTER ATA
In part II, I discussed t he scope of the holding in ATA -- how many types of regulatory

decisions are governed by the prohibition on agency consideration of costs. I concluded that the
scope of that holding depends on which of three inherently inconsistent canons o f construction the
courts adopt. I urged adoption of one and rejection of the other two, but I recognized that there
is not nearly enough clarity in the case law to determine which, if any, of the three canons is the
law today or to predict which will be the law in the future. Thus, the prohibition on agency
consideration of costs may apply only to EPA decisions pursuant to CAA section 109 and to one
or two other classes of regulatory decisions, or it may apply to scores of classes of regulatory
decisions.
In this part, I explore a question that is important independent of the scope of the holding
in ATA. How can, or should, courts review decisions of the type that gave rise to the dispute that
the Court addressed in ATA and that fall within the scope of the holding in that case? Specifically,
how can, or should, a court apply the arbitrary and capricious test to decisions to set maximum
permissible concentrations of substances that have no zero-harm threshold and a linear doseresponse curve without considering costs in any way?104 Neither the D.C. Circuit nor the
Supreme Court addressed that question in ATA,105 but both provided some clues t hat may be
useful in exploring the question.
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A.

The D.C. Circuit Rejected EPA's Explanation of Its Actions

The D.C. Circuit provided particularly good clues with respect to its likely resolution of
the arbitrary and capricious issue. The D.C. Circuit was unable to determine how EPA decided
"how much [pollution] is too much" when it set the new PM and ozone standards.106 The D.C.
Circuit used its inability to understand the basis for EPA's decision to support its holding that
EPA's interpretation of CAA section 109 is unco nstitutional. 107 That method of reasoning was
unprecedented and would have drawn into question the validity of scores of other regulatory
statutes.108 The Supreme Court's unanimous rejection of the D.C. Circuit's holding was
understandable and predictable.109 The Court has repeatedly approved of an alternative method of
reasoning, however, that is entirely consistent with the D.C. Circuit's rejection of EPA's action
based on the court's inability to understand why EPA made the decisions at issue. If an agency
has provided an explanation for an action that a court does not understand or that is inconsistent
with the available data, the court has a duty to reverse the agency action as arbitrary and
capricious.110 That is what the D.C. Circuit should have done in ATA.
The court explained why it could not understand the basis on which EPA chose the PM
and ozone standards it announced in the two rules at issue. In each case, EPA characterized the
likely relationship between concentrations of the two substances and the adverse health effects of
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the two as continuous and linear.111 EPA's quantitative estimates of the relationships between
concentrations and health effects were consistent with those characterizations. EPA estimated
that each increment of reduction in t he concentration of, or exposure to, PM would yield
approximately 10,000 fewer premature deaths per year,112 while each increment of reduction in
the concentration of, or exposure to, ozone would yield approximately 20,000 fewer incidents of
respiratory distress suffered by asthmatics each year.113
EPA said that it chose the new PM standard because "there is generally the greatest
statist ical confidence in observed associations for levels at or above" that level. 114 The court
rejected that explanation and many similar explanations because EPA could use them as easily to
explain any other conceivable choice of standards, i.e., at any level EPA chooses, the statistical
confidence in a correlation with adverse health effects will be greater for concentrations at or
above that level. 115 It is hard to imagine any explanation for EPA's choice of any particular
standard that can provide a rational basis for choosing one standard over any lower alternative if
the substance at issue is characterized by the absence of a zero-effect threshold and a linear doseresponse curve, and if EPA is not allowed to consider costs in any way. Thus, for instance, EPA
can always say that it chose an ozone standard of 0.08, rather than 0.09, because that decision will
eliminate about 20,000 incidents of respiratory distress per year, but it cannot explain why it
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chose 0.08, rather 0.07, when the choice of 0.07 would yield about the same increment in public
health improvement.116
Of course, EPA co uld explain its choice of both the PM and t he ozone standards easily if
it could refer to costs. EPA chose standards that are entirely consistent with its analysis of the
costs and benefits of alternative standards.117 Thus, for instance, it could defend its choice of 0.08
rather than 0.07, on the common sense basis that the costs of attaining a 0.07 standard exceed the
benefits of that standard. More broadly, EPA could defend its decisions to adopt standards that
continue to yield severe adverse health effects o n the basis that the only standards that would
prevent all serious adverse health effects would have catastrophic effects on the performance of
the economy. 118 EPA is legally prohibited from explaining its decisions in that manner, however,
because it is prohibited from considering costs. As a result, all of its standard-setting decisions
are highly vulnerable to t he D.C. Circuit's complaint t hat it cannot understand the basis for the
decision.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court said nothing that is at all helpful to an attempt to
understand the Supreme Court's posture on the arbitrary and capricious issue. Some Justices
began to press counsel for EPA to explain the basis for EPA's decisions at oral argument, but they
abandoned pursuit of that question when counsel reminded them that the arbitrary and capricious
issue was not properly before the Court.119 Justice Breyer alone hinted at a possible resolution of
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the issue in his concurring opinion.120
B.

Justice Breyer's Attempt to Explain EPA's Actions

Justice Breyer expressed the view that EPA would be able to explain its decisions to set
standards for no-threshold pollutants at levels above the economically catastrophic levels that
would eliminate both all adverse public health effects and all economically beneficial activity in the
U.S.121 He asserted that EPA has discretion to consider "context," including "the public's ordinary
tolerance of the particular health risk in the particular context at issue,"122 in deciding how much
pollution is too much. It is impossible to know whether other Justices share Justice Breyer's
views. Even if a majority of the Court were to adopt his views, however, they would not provide
an adequate basis for EPA to explain its decisions in this class of cases.
I am puzzled by some of Justice Breyer's reasoning. In places he seemed to paraphrase an
argument that the go vernment made in its briefs: barring EPA from co nsidering costs still leaves it
free to engage in "systematic weighing of pros and cons" when it sets standards.123 That
statement is simply false. If an agency cannot consider costs, it cannot consider cons. "Cons" and
"cost s" are synonyms. If an agency is barred from considering cons, and it can consider only the
pros of issuing a more stringent standard, it has no choice but to make a decision that eliminates
all adverse public health effects of a pollutant and all industrial activity in the nation. The
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government conceded that point in another part of its internally inconsistent brief: "Nothing in . . .
section 109 . . . allows EPA to set NAAQS at levels inadequate to protect the public from adverse
medical effects . . . ."124
Justice Breyer stated that EPA can consider "context" in deciding what is "requisite" to
protect the "public health."125 The "context" that is most important t o this class of decisions,
however, is the legally-mandated assumption that it is costless to eliminate all adverse health
effects of a pollutant. In that "context," any rational person would decide to take the steps
necessary to eliminate all adverse health effects. Justice Breyer attempted to illustrate his point
by not ing that we consider football helmets "safe" in context, even though helmeted football
players continue to suffer occasional head injuries.126 That analogy does not work. I am sure that
Justice Breyer would join me and all other right-thinking people in decrying a hypothetical
decision by the NCAA to reject a new helmet design that would eliminate all head injuries at no
cost. We would not consider the presently available helmets "safe" if we believed that there was a
costless safer alternative. It is simply irrational to refuse to take an action that yields benefits
without any costs.
Justice Breyer also expressed the view that EPA has discretion "to avoid regulating risks
that it reasonably concludes are trivial in context."127 Even if a majority of Justices were to agree
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with that controversial view,128 a trivial harm exception to the duty to protect the public health
would be of no help to EPA in the context of the PM or ozone standards. Based on EPA's
estimates, even compliance with the new PM standard would yield about 10,000 premature deaths
per year attributable to exposure to PM, while compliance with the new ozone standard would
still yield scores of thousands of incidents of serious respiratory distress per year attributable to
exposure to ozone. 129 No agency or court would characterize those adverse health effects as
trivial.
C.

Professor Heinzerling's Attempt to Explain EPA's Actions

Before giving up the search for a method of explaining EPA's line-drawing process, one
other possibility warrants consideration. Lisa Heinzerling contends that the D.C. Circuit and most
commentators have misunderstood what EPA means when it characterizes a substance as a
nonthreshold pollutant . According to Heinzerling130:
When EPA discussed the possibility that particulate matter and ozone are
nonthreshold pollutants, the agency was referring to the fact that these pollutants
have not been shown to have a threshold, that is, it has not been demonstrated that
these pollutants cease to have adverse effects on human health or the environment
below a certain level. EPA never claimed to have proven t hat PM and ozone have
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adverse effects on human health at every nonzero level. Thus, when EPA
discussed the possibility that these are "nonthreshold" pollutant s, it was referring
to a lack of evidence that there is a threshold.
To Heinzerling, it follows that EPA had a rational basis for its new PM and ozone standards and
that it can use the same basis to set st andards applicable to all other pollutants -- EPA set the
standards at the lowest levels at which it could prove the existence of adverse effects o n public
health. 131 She attempts to bolster this description of EPA's method of decisionmaking by referring
to the clause in CAA section 108 that requires EPA to describe and to act on "all identifiable
effects on public health or welfare."132 According to Heinzerling, EPA set the ozone standard at
0.08, instead of 0.07, for instance, because it found "identifiable" adverse health effects at 0.08
but not at 0.07. 133
I have three problems with Heinzerling's attempt to find a basis for EPA's line-drawing
decisions. First, I do not interpret EPA's statements of basis and purpose in the PM and ozone
rulemakings in a manner consistent with her description of EPA's decisionmaking process.134
EPA's statements are difficult to interpret. They are long and discursive, and they contain more
than a few internal inconsistencies . They clearly include, however, many descriptions of adverse
health effects of PM and ozone at concentrations below the levels EPA set for each pollutant.135
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As I interpret EPA's discussion and analysis of the many studies it had befo re it, EPA clearly
found the existence of significant adverse health effects of PM and ozone down to, and even
below, the nonanthropogenic background levels. Yet, it chose standards above those levels.
Second, I am concerned that acceptance of Heinzerling's pro posed method of det ermining
how EPA draws lines will have the unintended adverse effect of hamstringing EPA. According to
Heinzerling, EPA went as far as it legally could go in regulating PM and ozone. It set the
maximum permissible concentrations at the lowest levels at which it could "prove" the existence
of "identifiable" adverse effects. 136 I do not know how Heinzerling defines ambiguous terms like
"proof" and "identifiable" for this purpose. Courts have long accepted as adequate to support
regulatory action "proof" of harm that is equivalent to, or even less powerful than, the evidence
EPA had before it to "prove" that PM and ozone have adverse effects on health at concentrations
well below the levels EPA announced as the new maximum permissible levels in the two
rulemakings. As early as 1974, the D.C. Circuit held that:137
where . . . regulations turn on choices of policy, on an assessment of risks, or on
predictions dealing with matters on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, we will
demand adequate reasons and explanations, but not "findings" of the sort familiar
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from the world of adjudication.
I fear that the basis for line-drawing that Heinzerling ascribes to EPA and urges on courts could
return us to the bad old days in which courts rendered regulat ory agencies largely impotent by
demanding that they satisfy burdens of proof that are not attainable.
Finally, I cannot reconcile Heinzerling's description of EPA decisionmaking with the
language of CAA section 109. Heinzerling argues that EPA simply went as far as it could legally
go in regulating PM and ozone by set ting standards at the levels at which it could prove the
existence of identifiable adverse health effects. Yet, section 109 requires EPA to set standards
that "are requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate margin of safety."138 Surely, the
phrase "adequate margin of safety" at least confers on EPA discretion to set maximum permissible
concentrations at levels that are somewhat below the levels at which it can "prove" that a
substance causes harm to the public health.
In short, I see nothing in EPA's reasoning in the PM or ozone rulemakings that would
allow a court to determine why EPA drew the lines it drew in the two cases. I also see nothing in
the reasoning that either Justice Breyer or Professor Heinzerling attempt to attribute to EPA, or
to urge on EPA, that would allow a court to determine how EPA made its decisions in those
cases. The Supreme Court has held unanimously that a reviewing court must reverse an agency
action as arbitrary and capricious if the agency's reasoning is inadequate to allow the court to
identify the basis for the agency action. 139 It follows that a reviewing court should hold that the
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EPA's actions in issuing the new PM and ozone standards were arbitrary and capricious.
Moreover, the problems EPA encountered in its attempts to explain the bases for its new PM and
ozone standards are endemic to any attempt by any agency to explain, without any reference to
cost, why it chose any particular standard applicable to a no-threshold substance that is subject to
a linear dose-response curve. It follows that courts should reverse all such agency actions as
arbitrary and capricious.
I urge application of the demanding version of the arbitrary and capricious test the Court
announced in State Farm with great reluctance.140 Extensive empirical research has documented
the existence of a powerful tendency for judges to act in accordance with their partisan political
preferences when they apply that version of the arbitrary and capricious test to EPA actions.141
Thus, for instance, Ricky Revesz found that Republican judges concluded that EPA acted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner in fifty-four to eighty-nine per cent of cases, while Democrat
judges reached that conclusion in only two to thirteen per cent of cases.142 The judges who
comprised the D.C. Circuit panel in ATA acted in a manner consistent with that startling finding.
The two Republican members of the panel held the EPA action unlawful based on their conclusion
that EPA had not adequately explained the bases for its actions,143 while the Democrat member
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found EPA's reasoning adequate to explain the bases for its action. 144
I am extremely uncomfortable urging the courts to make widespread use of a doctrine that
is so malleable that it is highly susceptible to political manipulation.145 Thus, I would like to
identify an alternative to routine application of a strong version of the arbitrary and capricious test
as the basis to reject a high proportion of agency actions of the type at issue in ATA. I will
embark on a search for such an alternative in the next part of this article.
IV.

WHAT SHOULD EPA DO AFTER ATA?
In part III, I predicted that EPA will experience great difficulty defending its decisions to

establish standards in a manner consistent with the prohibition of its consideration of costs
announced in ATA. Those decisions are highly vulnerable to judicial rejection as arbitrary and
capricious. In this part, I explore potential ways in which EPA might be able to explain its
decision in this class of cases to the satisfaction of courts.
A.

The EPA Administrator Can Rely on The Opinions of People Who Have
Considered Costs

One possible option for EPA is a variation of the status quo ante, i.e., EPA could simply
continue to consider costs in its decisionmaking process while it continues to deny that it
considers cost s. That option requires so me explanation. As I explained in part III, it is impossible
to make a rational decision to decline to act in a manner that improves public health without
considering the costs of the action in some way.146 As a matter of simple logic and basic morality,
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EPA must take any costless action that improves public health. Yet, EPA has set air quality
standards at levels that continue to yield severe adverse effects on public health. It has done so by
considering costs sub rosa.
The ATA Court stated the prohibit ion on EPA consideration of costs broadly, but it
seemed to authorize only an extremely narrow method of enforcing that prohibition. In footnote
four, Justice Scalia said:147
Respondents' speculat ion that the EPA is considering . . . costs . . . without telling
anyone is irrelevant to our interpretive inquiry. If such an allegation could be
proved, it would be grounds for vacating the NAAQS, because the Administrator
had not followed the law.
Justice Scalia's choice of words in this footnote is interesting in several respects.
Justice Scalia referred to "speculation" that EPA is "considering" costs.148 That is not a
topic of "speculation." There is simply no doubt that EPA considered costs in the PM and ozone
rulemakings. Consider means "to think about seriously."149 As an institution, EPA clearly
thought seriously about the costs of the PM and ozone standards. EPA prepared a 718-page
analysis of the estimated costs of the two rules.150 It revised its cost estimates significantly in
response to comments from the many critics of its initial cost estimates, including congressional
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committees, the Department of Energy, and the President's Council of Economic Advisors. 151
Moreover, numerous people who played significant roles in the EPA decisionmaking process have
confirmed my belief that they personally considered costs and that they frequently discussed costs
with other participants in that decisionmaking process. The people who have told me they
considered and discussed costs include senior EPA staff members and members of EPA's Clean
Air Scientific Advisory Committee (advisory committee). Moreover, it is obvious that the White
House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) personnel who received, reviewed, and
critiqued the EPA cost estimates considered costs in their discussions with the President and with
the EPA personnel responsible for the rulemakings.
Justice Scalia's reference to "speculation" that EPA co nsidered costs when it is abundantly
clear that EPA considered costs suggests t hat he must be using some of the other words in
footnote four in idiosyncratic ways. There are at least three ways in which Justice Scalia may
have been replicating the behavior of the Cheshire Cat when he chose the words he used in
footnote four. First, he may have intended to prohibit only "the Administrator" from considering
costs. That would leave EPA staff, advisory committee members, and White House personnel
who play major roles in the EPA decisionmaking process free to consider costs.
Second, Justice Scalia may have been using an idiosyncratic and technical definition of
"consider." When he said that EPA could not "consider" costs, he may have intended only to
prohibit it from referring to costs as part of the basis for its decision. Courts have sometimes used
"consider" in that unusual sense of the word. Thus, for instance, the D.C. Circuit held that EPA
cannot rely on communications from the President as any part of the basis for its choice of an air
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quality standard, even though it recognized that "undisclosed Presidential prodding may direct an
outcome that is . . . different from the outcome that would have obtained in the absence of
Presidential involvement."152 That court also recognized that the President inevitably and
appropriately considers costs when he "directs" EPA to issue a particular air quality standard
pursuant to CAA section 109:153
The aut hority of the President to control and supervise executive
policymaking is derived from the Constitution; the desirability of such control is
demonstrable from the practical realities of administrative rulemaking. Regulations
such as those involved here demand a careful weighing of cost, environmental, and
energy considerations. They also have broad implications for national economic
policy. Our form of government simply could no t function effectively or rationally
if key executive policymakers were isolated from each other and from the Chief
Executive. Single mission agencies do not always have the answers to complex
regulatory problems. An overworked administrator exposed on a 24-hour basis to
a dedicated but zealous staff needs to know the arguments and ideas of
policymakers in other agencies as well as in the White House.
Third, Justice Scalia may have been using "proof" to refer to a particular form of proof
when he referred to the consequences of "proof" that EPA considered costs. Judicial review of
an agency action begins with a presumption of honesty and regularity so strong that it is virtually
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unrebuttable.154 The Supreme Court has prohibited anyone from interrogating an agency
decisionmaker to determine the actual basis for her decision except in rare circumstances.155
Thus, in the vast bulk of cases, a party can "prove" that an agency acted on the basis of its
consideration of prohibited factors only if the agency itself stated that it acted on the basis of
those factors.
As rephrased to reflect a definition of EPA that refers only to "the Administrator," a
definition of "consider' that refers only to "relies upon," and a definition of "proof" that refers only
to a confession, the holding of ATA might be restated as:
The Administrator of EPA is prohibited from claiming or admitting that the agency
used co sts as any part of the basis for any decision it makes pursuant to CAA
section 109.
As so restated, the holding of ATA would be entirely consistent with the demonstrable reality that
the EPA staff members, the EPA advisory committee members, and the OMB personnel who play
the dominant roles in the decisionmaking process consider costs. 156
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With the holding of ATA restated in that narrow, technical manner, EPA would have a
somewhat better chance of being able to defend its standard-setting process. Courts, including
the Supreme Court, have often held that agencies are allowed to consider the views of the White
House, the agency's staff, and the agency's advisory committee in making major decisions.157 The
member of the D.C. Circuit panel who found EPA's explanations of its PM and ozone rules
adequate referred repeatedly to EPA's reliance on the advice and opinions of its expert staff and
advisory committee to support his view that EPA had a rational basis for its actions. 158 Moreover,
both the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court have held unanimously that EPA may, and should,
defer to the President by relying "upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgements."159
That judicial recognition of the important roles of the President, the agency's staff, and its
advisory committee in EPA decisionmaking suggests that, while EPA cannot rely on costs as a
basis for its decisions, it can rely on the opinions of its staff, members of its advisory committee,
and the White House, even though those opinions are based on consideration of costs. EPA
relied heavily on the opinions and analysis of its staff and advisory committee to support its
decisions in the PM and ozone rulemakings. It noted, for instance, that no member of its advisory
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committee recommended adoption of an ozone standard below 0.08.160 Of course, EPA did not
mention what I have been reliably told and what should be obvious to anyone who looks at the
record -- the opinions of the members of EPA's advisory committee were influenced by their
knowledge that a standard below 0.08 would be extraordinarily costly to implement.
There is a problem with this potential method of defending EPA's standard-setting
decisions, however. No court has held that an agency can rely exclusively on the opinions of its
staff, its advisory committee, and/or the White House to explain and to support its decisions.161
The agency must rely at least in part on its own evaluation of the evidence before it. Thus, partial
reliance on staff, advisory committees, and the White House is insufficient to escape the need for
EPA to answer the critical question: Why did EPA refuse to take a presumptively costless action
that would protect public health more effectively than the action it took pursuant to a statutory
provision that instructs it to protect public health without considering costs?
B.

Can EPA Consider the Public Health Costs of a More Stringent Standard?

It is not at all clear whether the Court prohibited EPA from considering all costs, or just
economic costs, when it chooses air quality standards. The decision to adopt a more stringent air
quality standard can have both direct and indirect public health costs, as well as economic costs.
If EPA has the discretion to balance the public health benefits and the public health costs of
alternative standards, it may be able to defend its choice of standards as rational with reference to
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such a framework for decisionmaking.
EPA's new ozone standard illustrates the potential for a more stringent air quality standard
to have direct adverse effects on public health. Several studies, including one conducted by the
Department of Energy, have found that each incremental reduction in the ambient concentration
of ozone increases the incidence of skin cancer by increasing the population's level of exposure to
ultraviolet rays from the sun. 162 One study has estimated that EPA's new ozone standard would
yield an annual increase of 2,000 to 11,000 skin cancers and 25 to 50 deaths due to melanomas.163
EPA refused to consider that public health cost of the new ozone standards.164 The D.C. Circuit
reversed EPA on that issue and direct ed it to consider the public health costs of the new ozone
standard on remand.165 EPA acquiesced in that holding and has committed to reconsider its
decision whether to issue the new ozone standard in light of its consideration of the potential
effects of the standard on the incidence of skin cancer.
It will be interesting to see how EPA's consideration of the skin cancer effects of ozone
influences its decisionmaking with respect to the desirability of its ozone standard. EPA estimated
that the new PM standard would save about 10,000 lives per year, but it did not predict that the
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new ozone standard would save any lives. Thus, the ozone standard EPA adopts on remand must
reflect its attempt to balance a reduction of tens of thousands of cases of respiratory distress per
year against an increase of thousands of skin cancer cases per year plus fifty to one hundred
melanoma deaths per year.
The new PM standard appears to have no direct adverse effects on public health, but it has
the potential to cause large indirect adverse effects on public health. Many studies have found
that regulat ory rules that impose eco nomic costs have adverse effects on public health. 166 The
basic relationship at issue is well-known and has been documented in dozens of studies.167
Wealthy people are healthier and live longer than poor people. Economists have used that wellknown relationship between wealth and health as the basis for estimates of the quantitative
relationship between the costs of compliance with a regulation and the adverse effects of the
regulation on public health. Thus, for instance, a 2000 study conducted jointly by the American
Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution found that "strong evidence supports a causal
linkage between income and mortality."168 That study also concluded that a conservative estimate
of the relationship between wealth and health would yield a prediction of one life lost for every
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fifteen million dollars in regulatory compliance costs. 169

Other studies have estimated that one

life is lost for every 7.5 million dollars in compliance costs.170 Studies of the effects of EPA's new
PM standard have found that the new standard could cause as many as 27,000 deaths per year
attributable to t he combination of the estimated compliance cost s of the standard and the healthwealth relationship.171
EPA refused to consider the indirect health effects of the PM and ozone standards. Unlike
its treatment of direct health effects, the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA's refusal to consider the indirect
adverse effects of more stringent standards on public health. 172 The court distinguished between
the direct and indirect adverse public health effects of standards based primarily on its
interpretation of CAA section 108(a)(2).173 That section describes the "criteria" EPA must
consider in setting a standard for a pollutant as "all identifiable effects on public health . . . which
may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying quantities."
The direct adverse public health effects of a reduced concentration of a pollutant are effects of its
"presence . . . in the . . . air, in varying quantities," but the indirect adverse effects are not effects
of its presence, so the D.C. Circuit held that EPA must consider direct adverse public health
effects but need not consider the indirect adverse public health effects of a more stringent

169

Id. at 7.

170

Monsant o Co. v. EPA, 19 F.3d 1201, 1210 (7th Cir. 1994); International Union v.
OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
171

Ralph L. Keeney & Kenneth Green, Estimating Fatalities Induced by Economic Impacts
of EPA's Ozone and Particulate Standards 13 (1997).
172

175 F.3d at 1041. See also NRDC v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 972-973 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

173

42 U.S.C. §7408(a)(2).
47

standard.
The D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the CAA in this respect is plausible, but the opposite
interpretation would be at least as defensible. As the Supreme Court emphasized in ATA, section
109 is the most prominent provision of CAA. 174 That section instructs EPA "to protect the public
health."175 It seems strange to interpret the clearly subservient definition of "criteria" in section
108 in a manner that allows, or even requires, EPA to take an action that costs more lives than it
saves. How could EPA or a court defend such a decision as "requisite to protect the public
health?" EPA and reviewing courts will confront that daunting task if the Supreme Court
combines its ho lding that EPA canno t consider economic costs with the D.C. Circuit's holding
that EPA canno t consider the indirect adverse effects of an air quality standard o n public health.
The Supreme Court did not address either the question whether EPA must (or can)
consider the direct adverse public health effects of a more stringent standard or the question
whether EPA must (or can) consider the indirect adverse public health effects of a more st ringent
standard. The Court could provide EPA a means of explaining and defending its line-drawing
process by holding that EPA must consider both the direct and indirect adverse public health
effects of more stringent air quality standards. EPA then would be able to make rational decisions
by considering the pros and cons of alternative standards, with bo th the pros and the cons
expressed with reference to public health criteria. I would not expect this apparent new decisional
framework to have any effect on EPA's actual decisionmaking process, however. No matter what
Congress or the courts say, I am confident that EPA will continue to follow Benjamin Franklin's
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advice and make its decisions by comparing costs and benefits. 176 It is of no real consequence
whether EPA accomplishes that task by converting health benefits into their economic equivalents
or by converting economic costs into their public health equivalents.
CONCLUSION
I was disappointed with the Supreme Court's opinion in ATA. I had hoped that the Court
would use the case as a vehicle to enhance candor and transparency in regulatory decisionmaking.
EPA considers cost s when it sets air quality standards. It would have been nice if the Supreme
Court had legitimated that rational decisionmaking process so that reviewing courts and the public
could find out how EPA actually makes decisions. Instead, the Court forced EPA to continue to
hide its actual bases for decisionmaking behind an elaborate facade of meaningless verbiage. At
this point, I can only argue in support of a pair of actions that have the potential to reduce the
damage that the ATA opinion will inflict on attempts to encourage cando r and transparency in
regulatory decisionmaking – minimize the scope of the holding through careful choice of
applicable canons of construction and allow agencies to provide a somewhat more candid
description of their decisionmaking processes by encouraging them to consider the potential
public health costs of actions that are motivated by a desire to improve public health.
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